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The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
Alejandro M. Manelli
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
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peer-review
2
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Business & Economics
Signaling Games
100%
Best Response
88%
Infinite Games
38%
Sequential Equilibrium
34%
Existence of Equilibrium
30%
Economics
12%