Abstract
This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 152-173 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 1997 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Fingerprint
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
Cite this
The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games. / Manelli, Alejandro.
In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 74, No. 1, 05.1997, p. 152-173.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games
AU - Manelli, Alejandro
PY - 1997/5
Y1 - 1997/5
N2 - This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.
AB - This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031142649&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0031142649&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2248
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2248
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031142649
VL - 74
SP - 152
EP - 173
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -