The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)152-173
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume74
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Signaling games
Best response
Economics
Sequential equilibrium
Existence of equilibrium
Infinite games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games. / Manelli, Alejandro.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 74, No. 1, 05.1997, p. 152-173.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{f62f39ac55c6463884e02796111e1f3f,
title = "The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games",
abstract = "This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.",
author = "Alejandro Manelli",
year = "1997",
month = "5",
doi = "10.1006/jeth.1996.2248",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "74",
pages = "152--173",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games

AU - Manelli, Alejandro

PY - 1997/5

Y1 - 1997/5

N2 - This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.

AB - This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0031142649&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0031142649&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2248

DO - 10.1006/jeth.1996.2248

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0031142649

VL - 74

SP - 152

EP - 173

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

SN - 0022-0531

IS - 1

ER -