The never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games

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This essay considers a strong refinement of the sequential equilibrium concept, the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test, and identifies conditions under which the limit of the equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is an equilibrium outcome of the limit infinite game. As a consequence of this result, the existence of equilibria in a class of infinite signaling games is established. Since equilibria satisfying the Never-a-Weak-Best-Response test also satisfy various other refinements, e.g., the Intuitive Criterion and the Universal Divinity test, the existence results in this essay hold for those refinements as well.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)152-173
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - May 1 1997
Externally publishedYes


ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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