The model theoretic argument, indirect realism, and the causal theory of reference objection

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Hilary Putnam has reformulated his model-theoretic argument as an argument against indirect realism in the philosophy of perception. This new argument is reviewed and defended. Putnam's new focus on philosophical theories of perception (instead of metaphysical realism) makes better sense of his previous responses to the objection from the causal theory of reference. It is argued that the model-theoretic argument can also be construed as an argument that holders of a causal theory of reference should adopt direct realism in the philosophy of perception.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)146-154
Number of pages9
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
Volume84
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The model theoretic argument, indirect realism, and the causal theory of reference objection'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this