The donation paradox for peremptory challenges

Joseph B. Kadane, Christopher A. Stone, Garrick Wallstrom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but 'does better', according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)139-155
Number of pages17
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume47
Issue number2
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

Keywords

  • Backwards induction
  • Candidate types
  • Donation paradox
  • Jury
  • Power
  • Sequential decision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications

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  • Cite this

    Kadane, J. B., Stone, C. A., & Wallstrom, G. (1999). The donation paradox for peremptory challenges. Theory and Decision, 47(2), 139-155.