The donation paradox for peremptory challenges

Joseph B. Kadane, Christopher A. Stone, Garrick Wallstrom

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

5 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but 'does better', according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)139-151
Number of pages13
JournalTheory and Decision
Volume47
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1999
Externally publishedYes

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donation
Juries
Donation
Paradox
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Keywords

  • Backwards induction
  • Candidate types
  • Donation paradox
  • Jury
  • Power
  • Sequential decision

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Kadane, J. B., Stone, C. A., & Wallstrom, G. (1999). The donation paradox for peremptory challenges. Theory and Decision, 47(2), 139-151.

The donation paradox for peremptory challenges. / Kadane, Joseph B.; Stone, Christopher A.; Wallstrom, Garrick.

In: Theory and Decision, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1999, p. 139-151.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Kadane, JB, Stone, CA & Wallstrom, G 1999, 'The donation paradox for peremptory challenges', Theory and Decision, vol. 47, no. 2, pp. 139-151.
Kadane JB, Stone CA, Wallstrom G. The donation paradox for peremptory challenges. Theory and Decision. 1999;47(2):139-151.
Kadane, Joseph B. ; Stone, Christopher A. ; Wallstrom, Garrick. / The donation paradox for peremptory challenges. In: Theory and Decision. 1999 ; Vol. 47, No. 2. pp. 139-151.
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