Abstract
A donation paradox occurs when a player gives an apparently valuable prerogative to another player, but 'does better', according to some criterion. Peremptory challenges, used in choosing a American jury, permit each side to veto a certain number of potential jurors. With even a very simple model of jury selection, it is shown that for one side to give a peremptory challenge to the other side may lead to a more favorable jury, an instance of the donation paradox. Both a theorem and examples are given concerning the existence of the donation paradox in the optimal use of peremptory challenges.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 139-155 |
| Number of pages | 17 |
| Journal | Theory and Decision |
| Volume | 47 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - Jan 1 1999 |
Keywords
- Backwards induction
- Candidate types
- Donation paradox
- Jury
- Power
- Sequential decision
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Decision Sciences(all)
- Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
- Applied Psychology
- Social Sciences(all)
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Computer Science Applications