The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Alejandro M. Manelli

doi:10.1007/BF01213909

The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Alejandro M. Manelli

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

For a class of infinite signaling games, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies of finite approximating games converge to equilibrium strategies of the infinite game. This proves the existence of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for that class of games. It is well known that in general, equilibria may not exist in infinite signaling games.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	323-335
Number of pages	13
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	7
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01213909
State	Published - Jan 1 1996
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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title = "The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games",

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The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Abstract

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