TY - JOUR
T1 - The Challenge of Administration by Regulation
T2 - Preliminary Findings Regarding the U.S. Government's Venture Capital Funds
AU - Koppel, Jonathan G.S.
N1 - Funding Information:
The Support for Eastern European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1990 provided American aid to Poland and Hungary and set the template for future programs (Public Law 101-179). In addition to extending several traditional aid programs to these countries, the SEED Act created Enterprise Funds to develop the private sector through "loans, grants, equity investments, feasibility studies, technical assistance, training, insurance, guarantees, and other measures" (22 USCA §5421(a)). The Enterprise Funds were to be chartered as private nonprofit corporations but funded by government appropriation: $240 million for the Polish American Enterprise Fund, $60 million for the Hungarian American Enterprise Fund (§5421(b)(l),(2)). The first director was designated in 1990. The two funds incorporated and began operations shortly thereafter.
Funding Information:
The Enterprise Funds have a common skeletal structure uiat substitutes a set of different control tools for mose applied to traditional agencies or the largest class of hybrids, government-owned corporations. Indeed, the law allows the funds to carry out meir activities in accordance widi uie SEED Act "notwidistanding any other provision of die law" (§542 l(c)). This clause has been interpreted, after some agitation, to exempt the funds from all federal management laws including me Government Corporation Control Act (Cox 1990). This leaves essentially four tools of control that apply to die Enterprise Funds: presidential designation of directors; coordination by the State Department and AID; audit/reporting requirements; and negotiated grant agreements, corporate by-laws, and fund policies and procedures.
Funding Information:
• Grant agreements focus on the distribution of funds from AID to the Enterprise Funds and the requirements placed upon both the agency and the fund to facilitate payment. These requirements are largely driven by budget rules and do not include any imposition of policy direction as condition for obligation of funds.
Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - This article assesses the ability of elected officials to control public policy as implemented by public/private hybrid organizations, specifically, government venture capital funds. The study reveals greater control over OPIC investment funds than Enterprise Funds despite the existence of more traditional administrative tools of control for Enterprise Funds. This finding suggests that the regulatory infrastructure for hybrid organizations is more determinative of control than the existence (or lack) of traditional administrative control tools. Thus the challenge of hybrid government centers on the development of regulation as a substitute for administration.
AB - This article assesses the ability of elected officials to control public policy as implemented by public/private hybrid organizations, specifically, government venture capital funds. The study reveals greater control over OPIC investment funds than Enterprise Funds despite the existence of more traditional administrative tools of control for Enterprise Funds. This finding suggests that the regulatory infrastructure for hybrid organizations is more determinative of control than the existence (or lack) of traditional administrative control tools. Thus the challenge of hybrid government centers on the development of regulation as a substitute for administration.
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U2 - 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024426
DO - 10.1093/oxfordjournals.jpart.a024426
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037816957
SN - 1053-1858
VL - 9
SP - 641
EP - 666
JO - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
JF - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
IS - 4
ER -