The attractiveness of political markets

Implications for firm strategy

Jean Philippe Bonardi, Amy Hillman, Gerald Keim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

194 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We conceptualize democracies as marketlike processes where demanders and suppliers of various public policies interact. Firms may enter political markets to seek new or to maintain existing policies that affect their current business operations or future opportunities. We contend that a firm's decision to become politically active is influenced, in part, by the attractiveness of the political market, and we outline conditions that make political markets more or less attractive for firms to compete in to advance their interests.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)397-413
Number of pages17
JournalAcademy of Management Review
Volume30
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2005

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Industry
Firm strategy
Attractiveness
Suppliers
Democracy
Public policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)

Cite this

The attractiveness of political markets : Implications for firm strategy. / Bonardi, Jean Philippe; Hillman, Amy; Keim, Gerald.

In: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 30, No. 2, 04.2005, p. 397-413.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Bonardi, Jean Philippe ; Hillman, Amy ; Keim, Gerald. / The attractiveness of political markets : Implications for firm strategy. In: Academy of Management Review. 2005 ; Vol. 30, No. 2. pp. 397-413.
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