The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests

Ruyi Ge, Pengzhu Zhang, Bin Gu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest. We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the multiple-prize approach will be optimal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB)
Pages653-660
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event10th International Conference on Electronic Business - Service-Oriented E-Business, ICEB 2010 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Dec 1 2010Dec 4 2010

Other

Other10th International Conference on Electronic Business - Service-Oriented E-Business, ICEB 2010
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period12/1/1012/4/10

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Ge, R., Zhang, P., & Gu, B. (2010). The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) (pp. 653-660)