The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests

Ruyi Ge, Pengzhu Zhang, Bin Gu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest. We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the multiple-prize approach will be optimal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB)
Pages653-660
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event10th International Conference on Electronic Business - Service-Oriented E-Business, ICEB 2010 - Shanghai, China
Duration: Dec 1 2010Dec 4 2010

Other

Other10th International Conference on Electronic Business - Service-Oriented E-Business, ICEB 2010
CountryChina
CityShanghai
Period12/1/1012/4/10

Fingerprint

Contests
Optimal allocation
Coexistence

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Ge, R., Zhang, P., & Gu, B. (2010). The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB) (pp. 653-660)

The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. / Ge, Ruyi; Zhang, Pengzhu; Gu, Bin.

Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB). 2010. p. 653-660.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Ge, R, Zhang, P & Gu, B 2010, The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. in Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB). pp. 653-660, 10th International Conference on Electronic Business - Service-Oriented E-Business, ICEB 2010, Shanghai, China, 12/1/10.
Ge R, Zhang P, Gu B. The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB). 2010. p. 653-660
Ge, Ruyi ; Zhang, Pengzhu ; Gu, Bin. / The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests. Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB). 2010. pp. 653-660
@inproceedings{4039b13c7eb94018a33c7847f9c86bbf,
title = "The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests",
abstract = "A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest. We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the multiple-prize approach will be optimal.",
author = "Ruyi Ge and Pengzhu Zhang and Bin Gu",
year = "2010",
language = "English (US)",
pages = "653--660",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB)",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - The allocation of prizes in crowdsourcing contests

AU - Ge, Ruyi

AU - Zhang, Pengzhu

AU - Gu, Bin

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest. We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the multiple-prize approach will be optimal.

AB - A unique characteristic of crowdsourcing contest is the coexistence of multiple contests and each individual contestant strategically chooses the contest that maximizes his/her expected gain. The competition between contests for contestants significantly changes the optimal allocation of prizes for contest organizers. We show that the contestants with higher ability prefer to single-prize contests while those with lower ability prefer to multiple-prize contests, which makes single-prize contest is no longer the optimal choice for organizers as it was in the context of a single contest. We demonstrate that the organizers may allocate multiple prizes whether they intent to maximize total efforts or highest efforts, and presents the condition under which the multiple-prize approach will be optimal.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84873438122&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84873438122&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84873438122

SP - 653

EP - 660

BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB)

ER -