Tender‐offer premia as a management signal

John A. Polonchek, Myron B. Slovin, Marie Sushka

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we test whether tender‐offer premia for share repurchases can be viewed as an outgrowth of optimizing behavior by managers in a signalling environment. This is in contrast to previous work on the signalling hypothesis which focuses on the stock market's reaction to the announcement of tender offers. Our empirical results indicate that premia are systematically related to the price of the firm's stock and the level of the stock market but are not related to either management compensation, inside holdings of stock or the ratio of shares sought to total shares.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)69-76
Number of pages8
JournalManagerial and Decision Economics
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1986

Fingerprint

Managers
Financial markets
Announcement
Stock market
Signaling hypothesis
Management compensation
Empirical results
Stock market reaction
Tender offers
Share repurchases
Compensation and Redress

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Strategy and Management
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

Cite this

Tender‐offer premia as a management signal. / Polonchek, John A.; Slovin, Myron B.; Sushka, Marie.

In: Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1986, p. 69-76.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Polonchek, John A. ; Slovin, Myron B. ; Sushka, Marie. / Tender‐offer premia as a management signal. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 1986 ; Vol. 7, No. 1. pp. 69-76.
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