TY - GEN
T1 - SWiM
T2 - 22nd International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 2018
AU - Kolesnikov, Vladimir
AU - Rosulek, Mike
AU - Trieu, Ni
N1 - Funding Information:
he first author was supported by Office of Naval Research (ONR) contract number N00014-14-C-0113. The second and third authors were supported by NSF awards #1149647 and #1617197.
Publisher Copyright:
© International Financial Cryptography Association 2018.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Suppose a server holds a long text string and a receiver holds a short pattern string. Secure pattern matching allows the receiver to learn the locations in the long text where the pattern appears, while leaking nothing else to either party besides the length of their inputs. In this work we consider secure wildcard pattern matching (WPM), where the receiver’s pattern is allowed to contain wildcards that match to any character. We present SWiM, a simple and fast protocol for WPM that is heavily based on oblivious transfer (OT) extension. As such, the protocol requires only a small constant number of public-key operations and otherwise uses only very fast symmetric-key primitives. SWiM is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We implemented a prototype of our protocol to demonstrate its practicality. We can perform WPM on a DNA text (4-character alphabet) of length $$10^5$$ and pattern of length $$10^3$$ in just over 2 s, which is over two orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art scheme of Baron et al. (SCN 2012).
AB - Suppose a server holds a long text string and a receiver holds a short pattern string. Secure pattern matching allows the receiver to learn the locations in the long text where the pattern appears, while leaking nothing else to either party besides the length of their inputs. In this work we consider secure wildcard pattern matching (WPM), where the receiver’s pattern is allowed to contain wildcards that match to any character. We present SWiM, a simple and fast protocol for WPM that is heavily based on oblivious transfer (OT) extension. As such, the protocol requires only a small constant number of public-key operations and otherwise uses only very fast symmetric-key primitives. SWiM is secure against semi-honest adversaries. We implemented a prototype of our protocol to demonstrate its practicality. We can perform WPM on a DNA text (4-character alphabet) of length $$10^5$$ and pattern of length $$10^3$$ in just over 2 s, which is over two orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art scheme of Baron et al. (SCN 2012).
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072869924&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-58387-6_12
DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-58387-6_12
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85072869924
SN - 9783662583869
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 222
EP - 240
BT - Financial Cryptography and Data Security - 22nd International Conference, FC 2018, Revised Selected Papers
A2 - Meiklejohn, Sarah
A2 - Sako, Kazue
PB - Springer Verlag
Y2 - 26 February 2018 through 2 March 2018
ER -