Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games

Alejandro Manelli

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2812

Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games

Alejandro Manelli

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	480-484
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	102
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2001.2812
State	Published - 2002

Keywords

Cheap talk
Correlation
Existence
Infinite stage games
Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/jeth.2001.2812

Cite this

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author = "Alejandro Manelli",

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KW - Correlation

KW - Existence

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Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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