Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C6, C7, D8.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)480-484
Number of pages5
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume102
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

Keywords

  • Cheap talk
  • Correlation
  • Existence
  • Infinite stage games
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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