Strategic interaction and interstate crises

A Bayesian Quantal Response estimator for incomplete information games

Justin Esarey, Bumba Mukherjee, Will H. Moore

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Private information characteristics like resolve and audience costs are powerful influences over strategic international behavior, especially crisis bargaining. As a consequence, states face asymmetric information when interacting with one another and will presumably try to learn about each others' private characteristics by observing each others' behavior. A satisfying statistical treatment would account for the existence of asymmetric information and model the learning process. This study develops a formal and statistical framework for incomplete information games that we term the Bayesian Quantal Response Equilibrium Model (BQRE model). Our BQRE model offers three advantages over existing work: it directly incorporates asymmetric information into the statistical model's structure, estimates the influence of private information characteristics on behavior, and mimics the temporal learning process that we believe takes place in international politics.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)250-273
Number of pages24
JournalPolitical Analysis
Volume16
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

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interaction
equilibrium model
learning process
crisis behavior
International Politics
costs

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

Strategic interaction and interstate crises : A Bayesian Quantal Response estimator for incomplete information games. / Esarey, Justin; Mukherjee, Bumba; Moore, Will H.

In: Political Analysis, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, p. 250-273.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Esarey, Justin ; Mukherjee, Bumba ; Moore, Will H. / Strategic interaction and interstate crises : A Bayesian Quantal Response estimator for incomplete information games. In: Political Analysis. 2008 ; Vol. 16, No. 3. pp. 250-273.
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