TY - JOUR
T1 - Strategic aspects of cyberattack, attribution, and blame
AU - Edwards, Benjamin
AU - Furnas, Alexander
AU - Forrest, Stephanie
AU - Axelrod, Robert
N1 - Funding Information:
Were partially supported by National Science Foundation (NSF) Grant 1444871
PY - 2017/3/14
Y1 - 2017/3/14
N2 - Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-Theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: The conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, Estonia, Israel, Iran, and Syria.
AB - Cyber conflict is now a common and potentially dangerous occurrence. The target typically faces a strategic choice based on its ability to attribute the attack to a specific perpetrator and whether it has a viable punishment at its disposal. We present a game-Theoretic model, in which the best strategic choice for the victim depends on the vulnerability of the attacker, the knowledge level of the victim, payoffs for different outcomes, and the beliefs of each player about their opponent. The resulting blame game allows analysis of four policy-relevant questions: The conditions under which peace (i.e., no attacks) is stable, when attacks should be tolerated, the consequences of asymmetric technical attribution capabilities, and when a mischievous third party or an accident can undermine peace. Numerous historical examples illustrate how the theory applies to cases of cyber or kinetic conflict involving the United States, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea, Estonia, Israel, Iran, and Syria.
KW - Attribution
KW - Bayesian game theory
KW - Blame
KW - Cyber conflict
KW - Strategy
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85015423240&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85015423240&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1073/pnas.1700442114
DO - 10.1073/pnas.1700442114
M3 - Article
C2 - 28242700
AN - SCOPUS:85015423240
SN - 0027-8424
VL - 114
SP - 2825
EP - 2830
JO - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
JF - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
IS - 11
ER -