Stock trades of securities and exchange commission employees

Shivaram Rajgopal, Roger White

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We examine the profitability of stock trades executed by Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) employees. Subject to the considerable constraints of the data (no portfolio information, occupational details, or individual identifiers and an inability to determine profitability of trades), we find that a hedge portfolio mimicking such trades earns a positive abnormal return of about 8.5 percent per year in US stocks, driven primarily by negative abnormal future returns on sell transactions. The SEC claims that this result stems in part from employees being forced to sell stocks in a firm when they are assigned to secret investigations. We question whether this policy is reasonable.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)441-477
Number of pages37
JournalJournal of Law and Economics
Volume60
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1 2017

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profitability
employee
transaction
firm
Employees
Securities and Exchange Commission
Profitability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law

Cite this

Stock trades of securities and exchange commission employees. / Rajgopal, Shivaram; White, Roger.

In: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 60, No. 3, 01.08.2017, p. 441-477.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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