TY - JOUR
T1 - Stock market response to regulatory reports of deceptive advertising
T2 - The moderating effect of omission bias and firm reputation
AU - Wiles, Michael
AU - Jain, Shailendra P.
AU - Mishra, Saurabh
AU - Lindsey, Charles
PY - 2010/9
Y1 - 2010/9
N2 - Whereas a growing body of research has examined the consumer-related implications of deceptive advertising, the stock market consequences stemming from the regulatory exposure of such infractions remain largely unexplored. In a step to address this gap, the current research examines the effect of regulatory reports of misleading ads on firm stock prices. Results from an event study, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry as the empirical context, show an average abnormal return of -0.91% associated with regulatory reports of deceptive advertising. Analysis of the abnormal returns, however, reveals that the stock market response to these reports is shaped by omission bias, in that investors penalize commission violations more than omission violations. Furthermore, firm reputation is found to moderate the penalty for commission violations. In addition, two experiments examine the effect of such violations on investor beliefs. The first helps elucidate the process mechanism underlying the observed stock market effects and the second provides insights regarding the reputation-omission bias interaction for firms committing repeat violations. Overall, our findings provide important theoretical, managerial, and public policy implications regarding the role of financial markets in regulating deceptive ad practices.
AB - Whereas a growing body of research has examined the consumer-related implications of deceptive advertising, the stock market consequences stemming from the regulatory exposure of such infractions remain largely unexplored. In a step to address this gap, the current research examines the effect of regulatory reports of misleading ads on firm stock prices. Results from an event study, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry as the empirical context, show an average abnormal return of -0.91% associated with regulatory reports of deceptive advertising. Analysis of the abnormal returns, however, reveals that the stock market response to these reports is shaped by omission bias, in that investors penalize commission violations more than omission violations. Furthermore, firm reputation is found to moderate the penalty for commission violations. In addition, two experiments examine the effect of such violations on investor beliefs. The first helps elucidate the process mechanism underlying the observed stock market effects and the second provides insights regarding the reputation-omission bias interaction for firms committing repeat violations. Overall, our findings provide important theoretical, managerial, and public policy implications regarding the role of financial markets in regulating deceptive ad practices.
KW - Deceptive advertising
KW - Event study
KW - Experiment
KW - Firm reputation
KW - Omission bias
KW - Pharmaceutical industry
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U2 - 10.1287/mksc.1100.0562
DO - 10.1287/mksc.1100.0562
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:77958598947
SN - 0732-2399
VL - 29
SP - 828
EP - 845
JO - Marketing Science
JF - Marketing Science
IS - 5
ER -