Stock market response to regulatory reports of deceptive advertising

The moderating effect of omission bias and firm reputation

Michael Wiles, Shailendra P. Jain, Saurabh Mishra, Charles Lindsey

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Whereas a growing body of research has examined the consumer-related implications of deceptive advertising, the stock market consequences stemming from the regulatory exposure of such infractions remain largely unexplored. In a step to address this gap, the current research examines the effect of regulatory reports of misleading ads on firm stock prices. Results from an event study, focusing on the pharmaceutical industry as the empirical context, show an average abnormal return of -0.91% associated with regulatory reports of deceptive advertising. Analysis of the abnormal returns, however, reveals that the stock market response to these reports is shaped by omission bias, in that investors penalize commission violations more than omission violations. Furthermore, firm reputation is found to moderate the penalty for commission violations. In addition, two experiments examine the effect of such violations on investor beliefs. The first helps elucidate the process mechanism underlying the observed stock market effects and the second provides insights regarding the reputation-omission bias interaction for firms committing repeat violations. Overall, our findings provide important theoretical, managerial, and public policy implications regarding the role of financial markets in regulating deceptive ad practices.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)828-845
Number of pages18
JournalMarketing Science
Volume29
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 2010

Fingerprint

Violations
Moderating effect
Omission bias
Firm reputation
Stock market
Market response
False Advertising
Abnormal returns
Investors
Experiment
Penalty
Public policy
Pharmaceutical industry
Interaction
Event study
Policy implications
Stock prices
Financial markets

Keywords

  • Deceptive advertising
  • Event study
  • Experiment
  • Firm reputation
  • Omission bias
  • Pharmaceutical industry

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing

Cite this

Stock market response to regulatory reports of deceptive advertising : The moderating effect of omission bias and firm reputation. / Wiles, Michael; Jain, Shailendra P.; Mishra, Saurabh; Lindsey, Charles.

In: Marketing Science, Vol. 29, No. 5, 09.2010, p. 828-845.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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