State legislative influence over agency rulemaking: The utility of ex ante review

Brian J. Gerber, Cherie Maestas, Nelson C. Dometrius

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

Scholars have argued that legislatures can use administrative procedures to constrain bureaucratic discretion and maintain policy control when delegating authority. One such mechanism is the formal authority to review agency rule proposals. We find that legislatures with stronger formal authority to review rules ex ante are viewed by agency heads as more influential in their rulemaking decisions, but this power is mitigated when such review is checked by the governor. Our analysis demonstrates the impact of institutional arrangements on general state legislative influence over policy implementation. Understanding this element of legislative control over state bureaucracies helps explain variations in state-level policymaking.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)24-46
Number of pages23
JournalState Politics and Policy Quarterly
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2005

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Political Science and International Relations

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