State bureaucratic undermining

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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Abstract

Our federal rights are failing, and the inner workings of state government provide an explanation. States administer more federal rights than ever before; administering those rights requires intrastate coordination both horizontally (across cabinet-level state actors, agencies, and commissions) and vertically (with local governments like counties and towns). That coordination undermines federal law by creating bureaucratic barriers to full compliance. I unearth and identify three of these barriers - agency alienation, agency conflict, and role confusion - by surveying remedies in recent suits against state actors. These remedies take the form of choreography: they specify how internal state actors must work together to vindicate federal rights. I find that coordinating state bureaucracy requires the political will of several state actors, so federal rights that require intrastate coordination will not always reach politically marginalized groups like racial minorities and low-income populations. Because recent federalism scholarship has focused on lawful cooperation and conflict between states and the federal government, it has missed the ways that state coordination-based noncompliance can reinforce the very racial and income inequality that federal rights seek to address. State bureaucracy undermines federal rights in unexpected locations that do not follow traditional patterns of partisanship or geography. Remedying state noncompliance of this kind requires state and federal authorities to create coordination pathways through state bureaucracy responsive to the state's coordination challenges.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1083-1137
Number of pages55
JournalUniversity of Chicago Law Review
Volume85
Issue number5
StatePublished - Sep 2018

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bureaucracy
remedies
federal authority
state authority
federal law
alienation
federalism
Federal Government
low income
town
minority
geography
income
Group

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Law

Cite this

State bureaucratic undermining. / Weinstein-Tull, Justin.

In: University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 85, No. 5, 09.2018, p. 1083-1137.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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