Spectrum Auctions under Physical Interference Model

Yuhui Zhang, Dejun Yang, Jian Lin, Ming Li, Guoliang Xue, Jian Tang, Lei Xie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Spectrum auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to share their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users. Existing spectrum auctions either adopt the protocol interference model to characterize interference relationship as binary relationship or only lease channels that are not used by the primary user (PU) to secondary users (SUs). In this paper, we design spectrum auctions under the physical interference model, which allow PU and SUs to transmit simultaneously. Specifically, we consider both single-minded and multi-minded cases, and design auctions SPA-S and SPA-M, respectively. We prove that both auctions are truthful, individually rational, and computationally efficient. Extensive simulation results demonstrate that, these designed auctions achieve higher spectrum utilization, buyer satisfaction ratio, and revenue than a representative existing spectrum auction adapted for the physical interference model.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number8038071
Pages (from-to)719-728
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
Volume3
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2017

Keywords

  • Cognitive radio ad hoc networks
  • dynamic spectrum access
  • game theory
  • physical interference model
  • spectrum auction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Artificial Intelligence

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