TY - JOUR
T1 - Sociotechnical Network Analysis for Power Grid Resilience in South Korea
AU - Eisenberg, Daniel A.
AU - Park, Jeryang
AU - Seager, Thomas
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors would like to acknowledge Donghwan Kim for assistance with analysis, Younghan Chun for helping acquire South Korean power system data, and Taehun Lee for assisting with translation of technical documents. This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) (Grants nos. 1311230, 1441352, and 1415060). Jeryang Park was supported by Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT & Future Planning (NRF-2016R1C1B1011770).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 Daniel A. Eisenberg et al.
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - International efforts to improve power grid resilience mostly focus on technological solutions to reduce the probability of losses by designing hardened, automated, redundant, and smart systems. However, how well a system recovers from failures depends on policies and protocols for human and organizational coordination that must be considered alongside technological analyses. In this work, we develop a sociotechnical network analysis that considers technological and human systems together to support improved blackout response. We construct corresponding infrastructure and social network models for the Korean power grid and analyze them with betweenness to identify critical infrastructures and emergency management organizations. Power grid network analysis reveals important power companies and emergency management headquarters for responding to infrastructure losses, where social network analysis reveals how information-sharing and decision-making authority shifts among these organizations. We find that separate analyses provide relevant yet incomplete recommendations for improving blackout management protocols. In contrast, combined results recommend explicit ways to improve response by connecting key owner, operator, and emergency management organizations with the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. Findings demonstrate that both technological and social analyses provide important information for power grid resilience, and their combination is necessary to avoid unintended consequences for future blackout events.
AB - International efforts to improve power grid resilience mostly focus on technological solutions to reduce the probability of losses by designing hardened, automated, redundant, and smart systems. However, how well a system recovers from failures depends on policies and protocols for human and organizational coordination that must be considered alongside technological analyses. In this work, we develop a sociotechnical network analysis that considers technological and human systems together to support improved blackout response. We construct corresponding infrastructure and social network models for the Korean power grid and analyze them with betweenness to identify critical infrastructures and emergency management organizations. Power grid network analysis reveals important power companies and emergency management headquarters for responding to infrastructure losses, where social network analysis reveals how information-sharing and decision-making authority shifts among these organizations. We find that separate analyses provide relevant yet incomplete recommendations for improving blackout management protocols. In contrast, combined results recommend explicit ways to improve response by connecting key owner, operator, and emergency management organizations with the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy. Findings demonstrate that both technological and social analyses provide important information for power grid resilience, and their combination is necessary to avoid unintended consequences for future blackout events.
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U2 - 10.1155/2017/3597010
DO - 10.1155/2017/3597010
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85042220759
SN - 1076-2787
VL - 2017
JO - Complexity
JF - Complexity
M1 - 3597010
ER -