So close and yet so far

Promotion versus exit for CEO heirs apparent

Albert A. Cannella, Wei Shen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

162 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

"Heirs apparent" are frequently a central component of CEO successions but have been largely ignored in the succession literature. Our study examines heir apparent tenures and two contrasting outcomes - promotion to CEO and firm exit. We propose that the distribution of power among an incumbent CEO, outside directors, and an heir apparent influences these outcomes. Results suggest that outside director and CEO power are important influences on heir promotion and exit and that heirs who arise from within a firm are less likely to exit.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)252-270
Number of pages19
JournalAcademy of Management Journal
Volume44
Issue number2
StatePublished - Apr 2001
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Outside directors
Chief executive officer
Exit
Firm exit
Tenure
Incumbents
CEO succession
CEO power

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Business and International Management
  • Management of Technology and Innovation
  • Strategy and Management

Cite this

So close and yet so far : Promotion versus exit for CEO heirs apparent. / Cannella, Albert A.; Shen, Wei.

In: Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, 04.2001, p. 252-270.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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