Skepticism and evolution

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose meta-cognitive “skeptical” mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I end the chapter by sketching how we can use the account I develop here to respond to the skeptic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages141-169
Number of pages29
ISBN (Electronic)9781351685252
ISBN (Print)9781138051829
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

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