I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose meta-cognitive “skeptical” mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I end the chapter by sketching how we can use the account I develop here to respond to the skeptic.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Title of host publication||Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology|
|Publisher||Taylor and Francis|
|Number of pages||29|
|State||Published - Jan 1 2018|
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Arts and Humanities(all)