Skepticism and evolution

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose meta-cognitive “skeptical” mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I end the chapter by sketching how we can use the account I develop here to respond to the skeptic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages141-169
Number of pages29
ISBN (Electronic)9781351685252
ISBN (Print)9781138051829
StatePublished - Jan 1 2018

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Skepticism
Monitor
Skeptics
Natural Selection

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Arts and Humanities(all)

Cite this

Pinillos, N. (2018). Skepticism and evolution. In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology (pp. 141-169). Taylor and Francis.

Skepticism and evolution. / Pinillos, Nestor.

Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, 2018. p. 141-169.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Pinillos, N 2018, Skepticism and evolution. in Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, pp. 141-169.
Pinillos N. Skepticism and evolution. In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis. 2018. p. 141-169
Pinillos, Nestor. / Skepticism and evolution. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Taylor and Francis, 2018. pp. 141-169
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