Abstract
I develop a cognitive account of how humans make skeptical judgments (of the form “X does not know p”). In my view, these judgments are produced by a special purpose meta-cognitive “skeptical” mechanism which monitors our reasoning for hasty or overly risky assumptions. I argue that this mechanism is modular and shaped by natural selection. The explanation for why the mechanism is adaptive essentially relies on an internalized principle connecting knowledge and action, a principle central to pragmatic encroachment theories. I end the chapter by sketching how we can use the account I develop here to respond to the skeptic.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology |
Publisher | Taylor and Francis |
Pages | 141-169 |
Number of pages | 29 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9781351685252 |
ISBN (Print) | 9781138051829 |
State | Published - Jan 1 2018 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- General Arts and Humanities