TY - JOUR
T1 - Shared intentionality and the representation of groups; Or, how to build a socially adept robot
AU - Phillips, Ben
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022.
PY - 2022/7/7
Y1 - 2022/7/7
N2 - Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the cognitive primitives that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.
AB - Pietraszewski provides a compelling case that representations of certain interaction-types are the cognitive primitives that allow all tokens of group-in-conflict to be represented within the mind. Here, I argue that the folk concept GROUP encodes shared intentions and goals as more central than these interaction-types, and that providing a computational theory of social groups will be more difficult than Pietraszewski envisages.
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U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X21001242
DO - 10.1017/S0140525X21001242
M3 - Article
C2 - 35796367
AN - SCOPUS:85133609017
SN - 0140-525X
VL - 45
JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences
M1 - e115
ER -