Self-admissible sets

Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

11 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Best-response sets (Pearce, 1984 [28]) characterize the epistemic condition of "rationality and common belief of rationality." When rationality incorporates a weak-dominance (admissibility) requirement, the self-admissible set (SAS) concept (Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler, 2008 [17]) characterizes "rationality and common assumption of rationality." We analyze the behavior of SAS's in some games of interest-Centipede, the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chain Store. We then establish some general properties of SAS's, including a characterization in perfect-information games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)785-811
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume145
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2010

Fingerprint

Rationality
Best response
Perfect information
Repeated prisoner's dilemma
Common belief
Admissibility
Weak dominance

Keywords

  • Admissibility
  • Epistemic game theory
  • Iterated admissibility
  • Perfect-information games
  • Self-admissible sets
  • Weak dominance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Brandenburger, A., & Friedenberg, A. (2010). Self-admissible sets. Journal of Economic Theory, 145(2), 785-811. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003

Self-admissible sets. / Brandenburger, Adam; Friedenberg, Amanda.

In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 145, No. 2, 03.2010, p. 785-811.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Brandenburger, A & Friedenberg, A 2010, 'Self-admissible sets', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 145, no. 2, pp. 785-811. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003
Brandenburger A, Friedenberg A. Self-admissible sets. Journal of Economic Theory. 2010 Mar;145(2):785-811. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.003
Brandenburger, Adam ; Friedenberg, Amanda. / Self-admissible sets. In: Journal of Economic Theory. 2010 ; Vol. 145, No. 2. pp. 785-811.
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