Abstract
Indoor positioning systems (IPS) based on RSS fingerprints have received significant attention in recent years, but they are unfortunately vulnerable to RSS attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional cryptographic means. In this paper, we identify two practical RSS attacks on RSS-fingerprint-based IPS (RSS-IPS. In both attacks, the attacker learns the RSS-fingerprint database at the IPS server by acting as a normal user repeatedly issuing location queries and then impersonates selected APs with fake ones under his control. By carefully tuning the locations and transmission power of fake APs, the attacker is able to control the RSS experienced by victim users at target locations, leading to either a large location error or the IPS server misled into returning a fake location of the attacker's choice. We further design a fingerprint-matching mechanism based on a novel truncated distance metric as the countermeasure. Trace-driven simulation studies based on real RSS measurement data demonstrate the severe impact of the proposed attacks and also the effectiveness of our countermeasure.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018 |
| Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781538645864 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Aug 10 2018 |
| Event | 6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018 - Beijing, China Duration: May 30 2018 → Jun 1 2018 |
Other
| Other | 6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018 |
|---|---|
| Country | China |
| City | Beijing |
| Period | 5/30/18 → 6/1/18 |
Fingerprint
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications
- Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
Cite this
Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning : Attacks and countermeasures. / Yuan, Lizhou; Hu, Yidan; Li, Yunzhi; Zhang, Rui; Zhang, Yanchao; Hedgpeth, Terri.
2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. 8433131.Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning
T2 - Attacks and countermeasures
AU - Yuan, Lizhou
AU - Hu, Yidan
AU - Li, Yunzhi
AU - Zhang, Rui
AU - Zhang, Yanchao
AU - Hedgpeth, Terri
PY - 2018/8/10
Y1 - 2018/8/10
N2 - Indoor positioning systems (IPS) based on RSS fingerprints have received significant attention in recent years, but they are unfortunately vulnerable to RSS attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional cryptographic means. In this paper, we identify two practical RSS attacks on RSS-fingerprint-based IPS (RSS-IPS. In both attacks, the attacker learns the RSS-fingerprint database at the IPS server by acting as a normal user repeatedly issuing location queries and then impersonates selected APs with fake ones under his control. By carefully tuning the locations and transmission power of fake APs, the attacker is able to control the RSS experienced by victim users at target locations, leading to either a large location error or the IPS server misled into returning a fake location of the attacker's choice. We further design a fingerprint-matching mechanism based on a novel truncated distance metric as the countermeasure. Trace-driven simulation studies based on real RSS measurement data demonstrate the severe impact of the proposed attacks and also the effectiveness of our countermeasure.
AB - Indoor positioning systems (IPS) based on RSS fingerprints have received significant attention in recent years, but they are unfortunately vulnerable to RSS attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional cryptographic means. In this paper, we identify two practical RSS attacks on RSS-fingerprint-based IPS (RSS-IPS. In both attacks, the attacker learns the RSS-fingerprint database at the IPS server by acting as a normal user repeatedly issuing location queries and then impersonates selected APs with fake ones under his control. By carefully tuning the locations and transmission power of fake APs, the attacker is able to control the RSS experienced by victim users at target locations, leading to either a large location error or the IPS server misled into returning a fake location of the attacker's choice. We further design a fingerprint-matching mechanism based on a novel truncated distance metric as the countermeasure. Trace-driven simulation studies based on real RSS measurement data demonstrate the severe impact of the proposed attacks and also the effectiveness of our countermeasure.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85052575153&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85052575153&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CNS.2018.8433131
DO - 10.1109/CNS.2018.8433131
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85052575153
SN - 9781538645864
BT - 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ER -