Abstract

Indoor positioning systems (IPS) based on RSS fingerprints have received significant attention in recent years, but they are unfortunately vulnerable to RSS attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional cryptographic means. In this paper, we identify two practical RSS attacks on RSS-fingerprint-based IPS (RSS-IPS. In both attacks, the attacker learns the RSS-fingerprint database at the IPS server by acting as a normal user repeatedly issuing location queries and then impersonates selected APs with fake ones under his control. By carefully tuning the locations and transmission power of fake APs, the attacker is able to control the RSS experienced by victim users at target locations, leading to either a large location error or the IPS server misled into returning a fake location of the attacker's choice. We further design a fingerprint-matching mechanism based on a novel truncated distance metric as the countermeasure. Trace-driven simulation studies based on real RSS measurement data demonstrate the severe impact of the proposed attacks and also the effectiveness of our countermeasure.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ISBN (Print)9781538645864
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 10 2018
Event6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018 - Beijing, China
Duration: May 30 2018Jun 1 2018

Other

Other6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018
CountryChina
CityBeijing
Period5/30/186/1/18

Fingerprint

RSS
Servers
Power transmission
Tuning
Indoor positioning systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality

Cite this

Yuan, L., Hu, Y., Li, Y., Zhang, R., Zhang, Y., & Hedgpeth, T. (2018). Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning: Attacks and countermeasures. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018 [8433131] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2018.8433131

Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning : Attacks and countermeasures. / Yuan, Lizhou; Hu, Yidan; Li, Yunzhi; Zhang, Rui; Zhang, Yanchao; Hedgpeth, Terri.

2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018. 8433131.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Yuan, L, Hu, Y, Li, Y, Zhang, R, Zhang, Y & Hedgpeth, T 2018, Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning: Attacks and countermeasures. in 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018., 8433131, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 6th IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018, Beijing, China, 5/30/18. https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2018.8433131
Yuan L, Hu Y, Li Y, Zhang R, Zhang Y, Hedgpeth T. Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning: Attacks and countermeasures. In 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2018. 8433131 https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2018.8433131
Yuan, Lizhou ; Hu, Yidan ; Li, Yunzhi ; Zhang, Rui ; Zhang, Yanchao ; Hedgpeth, Terri. / Secure RSS-fingerprint-based indoor positioning : Attacks and countermeasures. 2018 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security, CNS 2018. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2018.
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