SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY

Natalia Kovrijnykh, Igor Livshits

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her endowment, and a lender uses random contracts to screen different types of borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers choose not to repay and thus become delinquent. The lender renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delinquency leads to bankruptcy. Applied to mortgage restructuring, our mechanism generates amplification of house-price shocks through foreclosure spillovers. We also show that government intervention aimed at limiting foreclosures may have unintended consequences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)499-527
Number of pages29
JournalInternational Economic Review
Volume58
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2017

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Bankruptcy
Renegotiation
Foreclosure
Screening
Amplification
Private information
Adverse selection
Unintended consequences
Spillover
Government intervention
Mortgages
Endowments
House prices

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY. / Kovrijnykh, Natalia; Livshits, Igor.

In: International Economic Review, Vol. 58, No. 2, 01.05.2017, p. 499-527.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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