Rogoff's "conservative" central banker restored

Berthold Herrendorf, Ben Lockwood

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

53 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We show that delegation of monetary policy to a weight-conservative central banker can be desirable, although the government can also use an inflation contract, an employment target, an inflation target, or any combination of these to control the central banker. The key feature of our model is a stochastic inflation bias, arising when wage setters receive some information about a supply shock prior to signing nominal wage contracts. Weight-conservatism is found to be desirable if fully state-contingent delegation is not possible and the stochastic inflation bias cannot be eliminated by optimal choice of the delegation parameters.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)476-495
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Money, Credit and Banking
Volume29
Issue number4
StatePublished - Nov 1997
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Bankers
Delegation
Inflation bias
Inflation target
Wages
Monetary policy
Supply shocks
Conservatism
Government
Inflation
Wage contracts

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

Cite this

Rogoff's "conservative" central banker restored. / Herrendorf, Berthold; Lockwood, Ben.

In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 4, 11.1997, p. 476-495.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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