TY - JOUR
T1 - Robust Revocable Anonymous Authentication for Vehicle to Grid Communications
AU - Kilari, Vishnu Teja
AU - Yu, Ruozhou
AU - Misra, Satyajayant
AU - Xue, Guoliang
N1 - Funding Information:
Manuscript received November 14, 2018; revised May 15, 2019 and September 24, 2019; accepted October 2, 2019. Date of publication October 6, 2020; date of current version October 30, 2020. This work was supported in part by NSF under Grant 1704092, Grant 1717197, Grant 1345232, and Grant 1719342, EPSCoR Cooperative agreement OIA-1757207, and in part by Intel under Grant 34627535. The Associate Editor for this article was C. T. Chigan. (Corresponding author: Guoliang Xue.) V. T. Kilari and G. Xue are with the School of Computing, Informatics, and Decision Systems Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA (e-mail: vkilari@asu.edu; xue@asu.edu).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2000-2011 IEEE.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - Electric vehicles can place a significant load on the power grid due to their unscheduled charging events. One way of improving power grid stability is to schedule electric vehicle charging in advance. Before a charging visit, the electric vehicle provides necessary information to request for charging at a charging station, which prepares and reserves the energy before the visit. However, the reported information can cause privacy leakage of the electric vehicle user. Anonymous information reporting can protect user privacy, but also enables attacks on the charging station by unauthorized users. An anonymous authentication system can address these issues, but cannot detect misbehaviors by authenticated users. One remedy to this is revocable anonymity-based authentication, which can revoke the anonymity of malicious users after their misbehaviors. However, we show that such a system is still vulnerable to application-level Denial of Service attacks, where a malicious user requests for large amounts of energy simultaneously from many charging stations, preventing these stations from serving other users. To address this, we improve upon an existing revocable anonymity-based authentication framework. We propose a permit-based mechanism, where each electric vehicle is only issued with one blind signature-based permit at a time. A request is valid only if it contains a valid and unused permit, which protects the system from the application-level Denial of Service attacks. Security analysis and experiments demonstrate that our framework, while ensuring user anonymity and being robust to the aforementioned attack, is also scalable and lightweight.
AB - Electric vehicles can place a significant load on the power grid due to their unscheduled charging events. One way of improving power grid stability is to schedule electric vehicle charging in advance. Before a charging visit, the electric vehicle provides necessary information to request for charging at a charging station, which prepares and reserves the energy before the visit. However, the reported information can cause privacy leakage of the electric vehicle user. Anonymous information reporting can protect user privacy, but also enables attacks on the charging station by unauthorized users. An anonymous authentication system can address these issues, but cannot detect misbehaviors by authenticated users. One remedy to this is revocable anonymity-based authentication, which can revoke the anonymity of malicious users after their misbehaviors. However, we show that such a system is still vulnerable to application-level Denial of Service attacks, where a malicious user requests for large amounts of energy simultaneously from many charging stations, preventing these stations from serving other users. To address this, we improve upon an existing revocable anonymity-based authentication framework. We propose a permit-based mechanism, where each electric vehicle is only issued with one blind signature-based permit at a time. A request is valid only if it contains a valid and unused permit, which protects the system from the application-level Denial of Service attacks. Security analysis and experiments demonstrate that our framework, while ensuring user anonymity and being robust to the aforementioned attack, is also scalable and lightweight.
KW - Smart grid
KW - V2G communications
KW - anonymous authentication
KW - revocable anonymity
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U2 - 10.1109/TITS.2019.2948803
DO - 10.1109/TITS.2019.2948803
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85096243752
SN - 1524-9050
VL - 21
SP - 4845
EP - 4857
JO - IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
IS - 11
M1 - 9214902
ER -