Risk and reciprocity: Hunter-gatherer socioecology and the problem of collective action

Eric Alden Smith, Robert Boyd

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

This chapter is concerned with the confluences of risk and uncertainty for the social interactions of human foragers involving resource sharing and land tenure. As part of a broad trend in the social and biological sciences (e.g., Dawkins 1982; Elster 1982; Ortner 1984; Lomnicki 1986; Roemer 1986), a special concern of our analysis is to adhere to the logic of methodological individualism, by showing how the characteristics of groups are best understood as the consequences (intended or not) of the actions and interactions of their individual members. In the present case, this involves some preliminary applications of the theory of games and evolutionarily stable strategies (Maynard Smith 1982; Parker and Hammerstein 1985).

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationRisk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies
PublisherTaylor and Francis
Pages167-191
Number of pages25
ISBN (Electronic)9781000238303
ISBN (Print)0813378214, 9780367286118
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

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    Smith, E. A., & Boyd, R. (2019). Risk and reciprocity: Hunter-gatherer socioecology and the problem of collective action. In Risk and Uncertainty in Tribal and Peasant Economies (pp. 167-191). Taylor and Francis.