TY - JOUR
T1 - Revolution versus evolution?
T2 - Understanding scientific and technological diffusion in synthetic biology and their implications for biosecurity policies
AU - Vogel, Kathleen M.
N1 - Funding Information:
20 I have greatly benefitted from financial support from the Ploughshares Fund and the Carnegie Corporation of New York for my biosecurity research. However, in recent years, both foundations have chosen to not support biosecurity research in order to focus their institutional priorities on nuclear security issues.
Funding Information:
funding social science research on synthetic biology. Therefore, there exists an opportunity now for private foundations to take a leading role in funding scholars to explore alternative frames and futures for synthetic biology in order to better inform the ongoing creation of policies and programs as the field develops. In November 2014, a 3-day workshop organized by Arizona State University and California Institute of Technology, and funded by NSF, will explore the development of a long-term research agenda regarding societal questions of synthetic biology. The output of this workshop could help inform not only the NSF, but also other foundations to support a broader landscape of social science research questions, such as the ones I have outlined here, on synthetic biology that would be of benefit to the broader synthetic biology community, policymakers and the public.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.
PY - 2014/11/11
Y1 - 2014/11/11
N2 - Synthetic biology enthusiasts often tout the emerging field for its present and future potential to revolutionize the life sciences. In the biosecurity arena, which has received considerable government and non-government attention, many are concerned that synthetic biology may prove to be an easier and cheaper way to conduct bioterrorism. To evaluate these claims, this article will focus on contrasting two different frameworks that have been used for understanding the development, diffusion and adoption of synthetic biology. In contrasting these frameworks, I will draw on examples from biotechnology and information technology because they are often used as analogies in synthetic biology discussions. I conclude that the critical elements for successful development, transfer, and use of synthetic biology methodologies and tools for harm are not purely material or technical, but involve important social dimensions that underpin technical work, requiring time, teams of experts, appropriate political, legal, and funding structures, and the development of new (still unknown) techno-organizational processes. To date, there have been few studies that have explored these socio-technical mechanisms of synthetic biology diffusion through in-depth examination at a micro and macro level. However, by having a more nuanced understanding of various synthetic biology approaches and how they are (or are not) able to travel easily to new settings, one can create a more refined spectrum of factors shaping threats from state and non-state actors related to synthetic biology. This article ends by outlining new research agendas important to support and pursue in order to improve biosecurity policymaking.
AB - Synthetic biology enthusiasts often tout the emerging field for its present and future potential to revolutionize the life sciences. In the biosecurity arena, which has received considerable government and non-government attention, many are concerned that synthetic biology may prove to be an easier and cheaper way to conduct bioterrorism. To evaluate these claims, this article will focus on contrasting two different frameworks that have been used for understanding the development, diffusion and adoption of synthetic biology. In contrasting these frameworks, I will draw on examples from biotechnology and information technology because they are often used as analogies in synthetic biology discussions. I conclude that the critical elements for successful development, transfer, and use of synthetic biology methodologies and tools for harm are not purely material or technical, but involve important social dimensions that underpin technical work, requiring time, teams of experts, appropriate political, legal, and funding structures, and the development of new (still unknown) techno-organizational processes. To date, there have been few studies that have explored these socio-technical mechanisms of synthetic biology diffusion through in-depth examination at a micro and macro level. However, by having a more nuanced understanding of various synthetic biology approaches and how they are (or are not) able to travel easily to new settings, one can create a more refined spectrum of factors shaping threats from state and non-state actors related to synthetic biology. This article ends by outlining new research agendas important to support and pursue in order to improve biosecurity policymaking.
KW - biotechnology revolution
KW - bioterrorism
KW - information technology revolution
KW - synthetic biology
KW - tacit knowledge
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U2 - 10.1057/biosoc.2014.31
DO - 10.1057/biosoc.2014.31
M3 - Review article
AN - SCOPUS:84934285521
SN - 1745-8552
VL - 9
SP - 365
EP - 392
JO - BioSocieties
JF - BioSocieties
IS - 4
ER -