Repeated games with present-biased preferences

Hector Chade, Pavlo Prokopovych, Lones Smith

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study infinitely repeated games with perfect monitoring, where players have β-δ preferences. We compute the continuation payoff set using recursive techniques and then characterize equilibrium payoffs. We then explore the cost of the present-time bias, producing comparative statics. Unless the minimax outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the equilibrium payoff set is not monotonic in β or δ. Finally, we show how the equilibrium payoff set is contained in that of a repeated game with smaller discount factor.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)157-175
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume139
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2008

    Fingerprint

Keywords

  • Perfect monitoring
  • Repeated games
  • Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium
  • β-δ preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this