Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks

E. V. Belmega, Lalitha Sankar, H. V. Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The conflict between cooperation in distributed state estimation and the resulting leakage of private state information (competitive privacy) is studied for a system composed of two interconnected agents. The distributed state estimation problem is studied using an information theoretic rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff model and a repeated non-cooperative game framework. The objective is to investigate the conditions under which the repetition of the agents' interaction enables data sharing among the agents beyond the minimum requirement. In the finite horizon case, similarly to the one-shot interaction, data sharing beyond the minimum requirement is not a credible commitment for either of the agents. However, non-trivial mutual data sharing is sustainable in the long term, i.e., in the infinite horizon case.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationNetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization
Pages64-68
Number of pages5
StatePublished - 2012
Event6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2012 - Avignon, France
Duration: Nov 28 2012Nov 30 2012

Other

Other6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2012
CountryFrance
CityAvignon
Period11/28/1211/30/12

Fingerprint

State estimation

Keywords

  • Competitive privacy
  • rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff
  • subgame perfect equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Software

Cite this

Belmega, E. V., Sankar, L., & Poor, H. V. (2012). Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. In NetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization (pp. 64-68). [6486115]

Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. / Belmega, E. V.; Sankar, Lalitha; Poor, H. V.

NetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization. 2012. p. 64-68 6486115.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Belmega, EV, Sankar, L & Poor, HV 2012, Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. in NetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization., 6486115, pp. 64-68, 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2012, Avignon, France, 11/28/12.
Belmega EV, Sankar L, Poor HV. Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. In NetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization. 2012. p. 64-68. 6486115
Belmega, E. V. ; Sankar, Lalitha ; Poor, H. V. / Repeated games for privacy-aware distributed state estimation in interconnected networks. NetGCoop 2012 - 6th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization. 2012. pp. 64-68
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