Reliability (or "lack thereof") of on-line preference revelation

A controlled experimental analysis

Li Chen, James R. Marsden, Zhongju Zhang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Networks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand and flourish. In some networks, the reliability of a contribution is not of particular importance. In other settings, however, the development of a network is driven by specific purposes which make the reliability of information exchanged of significant importance. One such situation involves the use of information markets for aggregating individuals' preferences on new or emerging technologies. At this point, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability of the preference revelations in such markets and thus the resulting preference aggregations and rankings of emerging technologies. In this paper, we study the reliability of on-line preference revelation using a series of controlled laboratory experiments. Our analysis includes individuals' pre- and post-experiment rankings of technologies, individual trading and accumulation activities during an electronics market experiment, the final experimental market outcomes, and a ranking of the same technologies by a panel of experts from a Fortune 5 company. In addition, as a final step, we allowed each participant to actually select and keep a unit of one of the technologies at zero price (free). That is, we were able to observe each participant's actual final true preference from the set of technologies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)270-274
Number of pages5
JournalDecision Support Systems
Volume56
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2013
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Technology
Experiments
Revelation
Controlled
Experimental Analysis
Experimental analysis
Electronic equipment
Agglomeration
Ranking
Experiment
Emerging Technologies
Emerging technologies
Industry
Skepticism
Laboratory Experiments
Fortune
Electronic markets
Preference aggregation
Information market
Laboratory experiments

Keywords

  • Controlled experiment
  • Information aggregation
  • Information market
  • Information revelation
  • Preference revelation
  • Survey accuracy
  • Survey reliability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Information Systems
  • Information Systems
  • Information Systems and Management
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology

Cite this

Reliability (or "lack thereof") of on-line preference revelation : A controlled experimental analysis. / Chen, Li; Marsden, James R.; Zhang, Zhongju.

In: Decision Support Systems, Vol. 56, No. 1, 12.2013, p. 270-274.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{52c00d5acf52446a890a0a22c8bdbbe1,
title = "Reliability (or {"}lack thereof{"}) of on-line preference revelation: A controlled experimental analysis",
abstract = "Networks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand and flourish. In some networks, the reliability of a contribution is not of particular importance. In other settings, however, the development of a network is driven by specific purposes which make the reliability of information exchanged of significant importance. One such situation involves the use of information markets for aggregating individuals' preferences on new or emerging technologies. At this point, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability of the preference revelations in such markets and thus the resulting preference aggregations and rankings of emerging technologies. In this paper, we study the reliability of on-line preference revelation using a series of controlled laboratory experiments. Our analysis includes individuals' pre- and post-experiment rankings of technologies, individual trading and accumulation activities during an electronics market experiment, the final experimental market outcomes, and a ranking of the same technologies by a panel of experts from a Fortune 5 company. In addition, as a final step, we allowed each participant to actually select and keep a unit of one of the technologies at zero price (free). That is, we were able to observe each participant's actual final true preference from the set of technologies.",
keywords = "Controlled experiment, Information aggregation, Information market, Information revelation, Preference revelation, Survey accuracy, Survey reliability",
author = "Li Chen and Marsden, {James R.} and Zhongju Zhang",
year = "2013",
month = "12",
doi = "10.1016/j.dss.2013.06.010",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "56",
pages = "270--274",
journal = "Decision Support Systems",
issn = "0167-9236",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Reliability (or "lack thereof") of on-line preference revelation

T2 - A controlled experimental analysis

AU - Chen, Li

AU - Marsden, James R.

AU - Zhang, Zhongju

PY - 2013/12

Y1 - 2013/12

N2 - Networks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand and flourish. In some networks, the reliability of a contribution is not of particular importance. In other settings, however, the development of a network is driven by specific purposes which make the reliability of information exchanged of significant importance. One such situation involves the use of information markets for aggregating individuals' preferences on new or emerging technologies. At this point, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability of the preference revelations in such markets and thus the resulting preference aggregations and rankings of emerging technologies. In this paper, we study the reliability of on-line preference revelation using a series of controlled laboratory experiments. Our analysis includes individuals' pre- and post-experiment rankings of technologies, individual trading and accumulation activities during an electronics market experiment, the final experimental market outcomes, and a ranking of the same technologies by a panel of experts from a Fortune 5 company. In addition, as a final step, we allowed each participant to actually select and keep a unit of one of the technologies at zero price (free). That is, we were able to observe each participant's actual final true preference from the set of technologies.

AB - Networks permitting anonymous contributions continue to expand and flourish. In some networks, the reliability of a contribution is not of particular importance. In other settings, however, the development of a network is driven by specific purposes which make the reliability of information exchanged of significant importance. One such situation involves the use of information markets for aggregating individuals' preferences on new or emerging technologies. At this point, there remains skepticism concerning the reliability of the preference revelations in such markets and thus the resulting preference aggregations and rankings of emerging technologies. In this paper, we study the reliability of on-line preference revelation using a series of controlled laboratory experiments. Our analysis includes individuals' pre- and post-experiment rankings of technologies, individual trading and accumulation activities during an electronics market experiment, the final experimental market outcomes, and a ranking of the same technologies by a panel of experts from a Fortune 5 company. In addition, as a final step, we allowed each participant to actually select and keep a unit of one of the technologies at zero price (free). That is, we were able to observe each participant's actual final true preference from the set of technologies.

KW - Controlled experiment

KW - Information aggregation

KW - Information market

KW - Information revelation

KW - Preference revelation

KW - Survey accuracy

KW - Survey reliability

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84889097059&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84889097059&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.dss.2013.06.010

DO - 10.1016/j.dss.2013.06.010

M3 - Article

VL - 56

SP - 270

EP - 274

JO - Decision Support Systems

JF - Decision Support Systems

SN - 0167-9236

IS - 1

ER -