Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

Tess M.S. Neal, Many other authors - a MultiLab replication

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

46 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)527-542
JournalPerspectives on Psychological Science
Volume12
StatePublished - Mar 1 2017

Fingerprint

Selection Bias
time
Replication
Time pressure
heuristics
money
inclusion
Economics
Pressure
human being
trend
economics
Time constraints
Inclusion
Causal effect
Selection bias
Heuristics

Keywords

  • cooperation
  • social heuristic hypothesis
  • Decision making
  • economic games
  • Social psychology
  • Replication

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). / Neal, Tess M.S. ; Many other authors - a MultiLab replication.

In: Perspectives on Psychological Science, Vol. 12, 01.03.2017, p. 527-542.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Neal, TMS & Many other authors - a MultiLab replication 2017, 'Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)', Perspectives on Psychological Science, vol. 12, pp. 527-542.
Neal TMS, Many other authors - a MultiLab replication. Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). Perspectives on Psychological Science. 2017 Mar 1;12:527-542.
Neal, Tess M.S. ; Many other authors - a MultiLab replication. / Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012). In: Perspectives on Psychological Science. 2017 ; Vol. 12. pp. 527-542.
@article{8f2a9e6bd75f45318d23819fff7ef9a3,
title = "Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)",
abstract = "In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tingh{\"o}g et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9{\%} of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5{\%} in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.",
keywords = "cooperation, social heuristic hypothesis, Decision making, economic games, Social psychology, Replication",
author = "Neal, {Tess M.S.} and {Many other authors - a MultiLab replication}",
year = "2017",
month = "3",
day = "1",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "12",
pages = "527--542",
journal = "Perspectives on Psychological Science",
issn = "1745-6916",
publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)

AU - Neal, Tess M.S.

AU - Many other authors - a MultiLab replication

PY - 2017/3/1

Y1 - 2017/3/1

N2 - In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

AB - In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.

KW - cooperation

KW - social heuristic hypothesis

KW - Decision making

KW - economic games

KW - Social psychology

KW - Replication

M3 - Article

C2 - 28475467

VL - 12

SP - 527

EP - 542

JO - Perspectives on Psychological Science

JF - Perspectives on Psychological Science

SN - 1745-6916

ER -