Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)409-429
Number of pages21
JournalConflict Management and Peace Science
Volume37
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2020
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Interdependence
  • sanctions
  • trade
  • vulnerability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Reconsidering economic leverage and vulnerability: Trade ties, sanction threats, and the success of economic coercion'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this