Abstract
I contend that a state’s position in the global trade network affects the initiation and outcome of sanction threats. A state is vulnerable, and thus more likely to acquiesce, when its trade has low value to trade partners that are well connected to the global trade network. Conversely, a state has leverage that could motivate the use of sanction threats when its trade has high value to trade partners that are otherwise not well connected. Capturing leverage/vulnerability with an interaction between two network centrality measures, results indicate that vulnerability is associated with acquiescence to sanctions, while leverage is associated with threat initiation.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 409-429 |
Number of pages | 21 |
Journal | Conflict Management and Peace Science |
Volume | 37 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 1 2020 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Interdependence
- sanctions
- trade
- vulnerability
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics
- Political Science and International Relations