Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Quine rejects Peirces theory of truth because, among other things, i ts notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of "nearer than" which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of "nearer than" applied to theories can be supplied from within Quines own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quines epistemology must be rejected or Peirces pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-112
Number of pages4
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume90
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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