Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth

Richard Creath

doi:10.1023/A:1004263318069

Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth

Richard Creath

History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, School of (SHPRS)

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Quine rejects Peirces theory of truth because, among other things, i ts notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of "nearer than" which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of "nearer than" applied to theories can be supplied from within Quines own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quines epistemology must be rejected or Peirces pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	109-112
Number of pages	4
Journal	Philosophical Studies
Volume	90
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004263318069
State	Published - 1998

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy

Access to Document

10.1023/A:1004263318069

Cite this

@article{b61c8dcdc8da49c4a468660c3e430b54,

title = "Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth",

abstract = "Quine rejects Peirces theory of truth because, among other things, i ts notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of {"}nearer than{"} which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of {"}nearer than{"} applied to theories can be supplied from within Quines own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quines epistemology must be rejected or Peirces pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.",

author = "Richard Creath",

year = "1998",

doi = "10.1023/A:1004263318069",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "90",

pages = "109--112",

journal = "Philosophical Studies",

issn = "0031-8116",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth

AU - Creath, Richard

PY - 1998

Y1 - 1998

N2 - Quine rejects Peirces theory of truth because, among other things, i ts notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of "nearer than" which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of "nearer than" applied to theories can be supplied from within Quines own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quines epistemology must be rejected or Peirces pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.

AB - Quine rejects Peirces theory of truth because, among other things, i ts notion of a limit of a sequence of theories is defective in that the notion of a limit depends on that of "nearer than" which is defined for numbers but not for theories. This paper shows that the missing definition of "nearer than" applied to theories can be supplied from within Quines own epistemology. The upshot is that either Quines epistemology must be rejected or Peirces pragmatic theory of truth is partially vindicated.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34248762913&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34248762913&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1023/A:1004263318069

DO - 10.1023/A:1004263318069

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:34248762913

SN - 0031-8116

VL - 90

SP - 109

EP - 112

JO - Philosophical Studies

JF - Philosophical Studies

IS - 2

ER -

Quine and the limit assumption in peirces theory of truth

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this