QUAC: Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing

Ming Li, Jian Lin, Dejun Yang, Guoliang Xue, Jian Tang

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Crowdsensing is a sensing method which involves participants from general public to collect sensed data from their mobile devices, and also contribute and utilize a common database. To ensure a crowdsensing system to operate properly, there must be certain effective and efficient incentive mechanism to attract users and stimulate them to submit sensing data with high quality. Intuitively, the agreement on the qualities and payments in crowdsensing systems can be best modeled as a contract. However, none of existing incentive mechanisms consider data quality through effective contract design. In this paper, we design two quality-aware contract-based incentive mechanisms for crowdsensing, named QUAC-F and QUAC-I, under full information model and incomplete information model, respectively, which differ in the level of users' information known to the system. Both QUAC-F and QUAC-I are guaranteed to maximize the platform utility while satisfying individual rationality and incentive compatibility. We evaluate the performance of our designed mechanisms based on a real dataset.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages72-80
Number of pages9
ISBN (Electronic)9781538623237
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 14 2017
Event14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017 - Orlando, United States
Duration: Oct 22 2017Oct 25 2017

Other

Other14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017
CountryUnited States
CityOrlando
Period10/22/1710/25/17

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incentives
Mobile devices
compatibility
platforms

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mechanical Engineering
  • Instrumentation
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Cite this

Li, M., Lin, J., Yang, D., Xue, G., & Tang, J. (2017). QUAC: Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing. In Proceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017 (pp. 72-80). [8108730] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/MASS.2017.45

QUAC : Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing. / Li, Ming; Lin, Jian; Yang, Dejun; Xue, Guoliang; Tang, Jian.

Proceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. p. 72-80 8108730.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Li, M, Lin, J, Yang, D, Xue, G & Tang, J 2017, QUAC: Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing. in Proceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017., 8108730, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 72-80, 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017, Orlando, United States, 10/22/17. https://doi.org/10.1109/MASS.2017.45
Li M, Lin J, Yang D, Xue G, Tang J. QUAC: Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing. In Proceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. 2017. p. 72-80. 8108730 https://doi.org/10.1109/MASS.2017.45
Li, Ming ; Lin, Jian ; Yang, Dejun ; Xue, Guoliang ; Tang, Jian. / QUAC : Quality-Aware Contract-Based Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing. Proceedings - 14th IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Sensor Systems, MASS 2017. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2017. pp. 72-80
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