Punishment, rational expectations, and relative payoffs in a networked prisoners dilemma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Experimental economics has consistently revealed human behavior at odds with theoretical expectations of rational agents. This is especially true in laboratory games with costly punishment where humans routinely pay to punish others for selfish behavior even though the punisher receives no benefit in return. This phenomenon occurs even when interactions are anonymous and the punisher will never interact with the punishee again. However, costly punishment may not be inconsistent with Darwinian notions of relative fitness. This paper presents exploratory work aimed at a reconciliation between economic and biological expectations of behavior. Agent-based modelling is used to simulate networked populations whose members play the prisoners dilemma while having the ability to altruistically punish one another. Results show that behavior evolving in structured populations does not conform to economic expectations of evolution driven by absolute payoff maximization. Instead results better match behavior expected from a biological perspective in which evolution is driven by relative payoff maximization. Results further suggest that subtle effects of network structure must be considered in theories addressing individual economic behavior.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSocial Computing and Behavioral Modeling
Pages201-208
Number of pages8
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2009
Event2nd International Workshop on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling and Prediction, SBP 2009 - Phoenix, AZ, United States
Duration: Mar 31 2009Apr 1 2009

Other

Other2nd International Workshop on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling and Prediction, SBP 2009
CountryUnited States
CityPhoenix, AZ
Period3/31/094/1/09

Fingerprint

Rational Expectations
Prisoners' Dilemma
Economics
Experimental Economics
Reconciliation
Agent-based Modeling
Odds
Structured Populations
Human Behavior
Network Structure
Inconsistent
Fitness
Game
Interaction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Modeling and Simulation

Cite this

Punishment, rational expectations, and relative payoffs in a networked prisoners dilemma. / Shutters, Shade.

Social Computing and Behavioral Modeling. 2009. p. 201-208.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Shutters, S 2009, Punishment, rational expectations, and relative payoffs in a networked prisoners dilemma. in Social Computing and Behavioral Modeling. pp. 201-208, 2nd International Workshop on Social Computing, Behavioral Modeling and Prediction, SBP 2009, Phoenix, AZ, United States, 3/31/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0056-2-25
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