Abstract
We examine financing activities of newly public firms for evidence on capital staging in the public equity market. Staging (sequential financing) can increase issuance costs but can limit costs associated with overinvestment. We find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that staging is employed to help control the overinvestment problem in public firms. Initial public offering (IPO) proceeds, relative to external financing requirements, are smaller for firms with more intangible assets and more research and development (R&D)-intensive firms. Asset intangibility and R&D intensity are also both negatively related to the length of time from a firm's IPO to its first post-IPO capital infusion.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 72-90 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Financial Economics |
Volume | 106 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 1 2012 |
Keywords
- Cash holdings
- Initial public offering
- Managerial incentives
- Staging of capital
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
- Strategy and Management