Property Rights Regimes, Technological Innovation, and Foreign Direct Investment

Mark David Nieman, Cameron Thies

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

We argue that democratic institutions influence property rights in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) by providing: (1) a coherent logic to the property rights regime that is created in a state and (2) a legitimate way to manage conflicts that arise in dynamic economies. We expect that the marginal effect of property rights in attracting FDI has increased over time with the rate of technological dynamism. We test this using a non-nested multilevel modeling strategy with random coefficients on data from 1970 to 2009. Our results demonstrate that the effect of property rights on attracting FDI is contingent on democratic institutions and that this effect becomes more pronounced over time. This effect holds for both developing and developed countries across all regions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)451-469
Number of pages19
JournalPolitical Science Research and Methods
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

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technical innovation
right of ownership
direct investment
foreign investment
dynamism
economy
time

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations

Cite this

Property Rights Regimes, Technological Innovation, and Foreign Direct Investment. / Nieman, Mark David; Thies, Cameron.

In: Political Science Research and Methods, Vol. 7, No. 3, 01.07.2019, p. 451-469.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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