PROMISE: A framework for truthful and profit maximizing spectrum double auctions

Dejun Yang, Xiang Zhang, Guoliang Xue

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

34 Scopus citations

Abstract

Auctions provide a platform for licensed spectrum users to trade their underutilized spectrum with unlicensed users. Existing spectrum auctions either do not apply to the scenarios where multiple sellers and buyers both make offers, or assume the knowledge of the users' valuation distribution for maximizing the profit of the auction. To fill this void, we design PROMISE, a framework for spectrum double auctions, which jointly considers spectrum reusability, truthfulness, and profit maximization without the distribution knowledge. We propose a novel technique, called cross extraction, to compute the bid representing a group of secondary users, who can share a common channel. We prove that PROMISE is computationally efficient, individual-rational, and truthful. In addition, PROMISE is guaranteed to achieve an approximate profit of the optimal auction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationIEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages109-117
Number of pages9
ISBN (Print)9781479933600
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014
Event33rd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - Toronto, ON, Canada
Duration: Apr 27 2014May 2 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE INFOCOM
ISSN (Print)0743-166X

Other

Other33rd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2014
CountryCanada
CityToronto, ON
Period4/27/145/2/14

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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