Privatisation and the quality of rail services

P. K. Else, Timothy James

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using the concept of generalised costs to reflect quality in rail services, we consider the level of provision and quality of these services in the various forms they may take in a privatised environment within a model where we assume linear and separable demand and cost functions for analytical simplicity. Using the Pareto-efficient output and quality outcomes under a fully integrated system for reference (as well as those for a fully integrated profit-maximising monopolist) we show that if either bilateral monopoly or complementary monopoly emerge as a market structure the output of train services and their quality will generally fall. In the case of the emergence of both bilateral monopoly and complementary monopoly our analysis again suggests poor welfare outcomes. The implication that can be drawn from our analysis is that a regulator of a privatised rail system faces some severe problems if she is to attain the appropriate welfare targets.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)387-400
Number of pages14
JournalTransportation Research Part A
Volume29
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1995
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Privatization
monopoly
privatization
Rails
Cost functions
Profitability
Quality of service
welfare
integrated system
costs
Costs
profit
Rail
demand
market
Monopoly
Bilateral monopoly

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Transportation
  • Management Science and Operations Research

Cite this

Privatisation and the quality of rail services. / Else, P. K.; James, Timothy.

In: Transportation Research Part A, Vol. 29, No. 6, 01.01.1995, p. 387-400.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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