Pragmatic interests and imprecise belief

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Abstract

Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory should model them. I explore the idea and how it relates to work on imprecise probabilities and second-order confidence.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)758-768
Number of pages11
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume80
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2013

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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