Abstract
In this study, we view the contracts of top managers from an integrated agency theory-trust perspective, arguing that two conditions reflecting CEO risk bearing, top management team (TMT) behavioral uncertainty and CEO vulnerability, are negatively related to a CEO's perceptions of TMT benevolence toward him-/herself, which in turn influence the protective features of TMT contracts. Model tests on data from 122 family-owned firms in Spain support our hypotheses overall. Agency theory may be enhanced by accounting for a CEO's perceptions (as principal) of TMT benevolence and for the effect of those perceptions on contracts with TMT members (as agents).
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 69-89 |
| Number of pages | 21 |
| Journal | Academy of Management Journal |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 1 2010 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Strategy and Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation