Abstract
An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 022121 |
| Journal | Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics |
| Volume | 91 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Feb 17 2015 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Condensed Matter Physics
- Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Statistics and Probability
Cite this
Peer pressure : Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment. / Yang, Han Xin; Wu, Zhi Xi; Rong, Zhihai; Lai, Ying-Cheng.
In: Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 91, No. 2, 022121, 17.02.2015.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Peer pressure
T2 - Enhancement of cooperation through mutual punishment
AU - Yang, Han Xin
AU - Wu, Zhi Xi
AU - Rong, Zhihai
AU - Lai, Ying-Cheng
PY - 2015/2/17
Y1 - 2015/2/17
N2 - An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.
AB - An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain cooperation among selfish individuals. We investigate a symmetric punishment strategy, in which an individual will punish each neighbor if their strategies are different, and vice versa. Because of the symmetry in imposing the punishment, one might intuitively expect the strategy to have little effect on cooperation. Utilizing the prisoner's dilemma game as a prototypical model of interactions at the individual level, we find, through simulation and theoretical analysis, that proper punishment, when even symmetrically imposed on individuals, can enhance cooperation. Also, we find that the initial density of cooperators plays an important role in the evolution of cooperation driven by mutual punishment.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84923246646&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84923246646&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.91.022121
DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.91.022121
M3 - Article
C2 - 25768472
AN - SCOPUS:84923246646
VL - 91
JO - Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
JF - Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics
SN - 1539-3755
IS - 2
M1 - 022121
ER -