PCB Hardware Trojans: Attack Modes and Detection Strategies

Matthew McGuire; Umit Ogras; Sule Ozev

doi:10.1109/VTS.2019.8758643

PCB Hardware Trojans: Attack Modes and Detection Strategies

Matthew McGuire, Umit Ogras, Sule Ozev

Engineering, Ira A. Fulton Schools of (IAFSE)

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019
Publisher	IEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)	9781728111704
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/VTS.2019.8758643
State	Published - Apr 1 2019
Event	37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019 - Monterey, United States Duration: Apr 23 2019 → Apr 25 2019

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium
Volume	2019-April

Conference

Conference	37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019
Country	United States
City	Monterey
Period	4/23/19 → 4/25/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Computer Science Applications
Electrical and Electronic Engineering

Access to Document

10.1109/VTS.2019.8758643

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Cite this

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abstract = "Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.",

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