Abstract
Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | 2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019 |
| Publisher | IEEE Computer Society |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9781728111704 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Apr 1 2019 |
| Event | 37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019 - Monterey, United States Duration: Apr 23 2019 → Apr 25 2019 |
Publication series
| Name | Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium |
|---|---|
| Volume | 2019-April |
Conference
| Conference | 37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019 |
|---|---|
| Country | United States |
| City | Monterey |
| Period | 4/23/19 → 4/25/19 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science Applications
- Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cite this
PCB Hardware Trojans : Attack Modes and Detection Strategies. / McGuire, Matthew; Ogras, Umit; Ozev, Sule.
2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019. IEEE Computer Society, 2019. 8758643 (Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium; Vol. 2019-April).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - PCB Hardware Trojans
T2 - Attack Modes and Detection Strategies
AU - McGuire, Matthew
AU - Ogras, Umit
AU - Ozev, Sule
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.
AB - Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069196356&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85069196356&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/VTS.2019.8758643
DO - 10.1109/VTS.2019.8758643
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85069196356
T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium
BT - 2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019
PB - IEEE Computer Society
ER -