PCB Hardware Trojans: Attack Modes and Detection Strategies

Matthew McGuire, Umit Ogras, Sule Ozev

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Ensuring security of electronic hardware has recently attracted much attention. While a majority of the work in this domain has focused on integrated circuits, printed circuit boards are just as susceptible to unwanted and unauthorized modifications during their manufacturing. Prior work in this domain has shown some examples of failures that can stem from intentional and unintentional board-level modifications. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of previously unexplored board-level modifications and show that a number of attack modes cannot be detected using traditional methods. We also show that it is possible to detect attack modes that are most damaging to the board operation by redesigning the board with additional accessibility and adding specialized test sequences.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2019 IEEE 37th VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
ISBN (Electronic)9781728111704
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2019
Event37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019 - Monterey, United States
Duration: Apr 23 2019Apr 25 2019

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE VLSI Test Symposium
Volume2019-April

Conference

Conference37th IEEE VLSI Test Symposium, VTS 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMonterey
Period4/23/194/25/19

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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