Abstract
In their response to our paper, Amihud and Lev (1999) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) claim that disciplinary differences don't matter and that methods and evidence should speak for themselves. In contrast, we argue that important differences exist between financial economics and strategic management, leading to differing beliefs, norms, methods, and interpretations of empirical results. Using a strategic management perspective to review the evidence presented by Amihud and Lev in their earlier study (1981) and in their and Denis et al.'s critiques of our work (1999), we find no reason to revise our original conclusion: there is little theoretical or empirical basis for believing that monitoring by a firm's principals influences its diversification strategy and acquisition decisions.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1077-1086 |
| Number of pages | 10 |
| Journal | Strategic Management Journal |
| Volume | 20 |
| Issue number | 11 |
| State | Published - Nov 1999 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Agency theory
- Diversification
- Management theory
- Mergers
- Scientific disciplines
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business and International Management
- Management of Technology and Innovation
- Strategy and Management
Cite this
Ownership structure and corporate strategy : One question viewed from two different worlds. / Lane, Peter J.; Cannella, Albert A.; Lubatkin, Michael H.
In: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 20, No. 11, 11.1999, p. 1077-1086.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Ownership structure and corporate strategy
T2 - One question viewed from two different worlds
AU - Lane, Peter J.
AU - Cannella, Albert A.
AU - Lubatkin, Michael H.
PY - 1999/11
Y1 - 1999/11
N2 - In their response to our paper, Amihud and Lev (1999) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) claim that disciplinary differences don't matter and that methods and evidence should speak for themselves. In contrast, we argue that important differences exist between financial economics and strategic management, leading to differing beliefs, norms, methods, and interpretations of empirical results. Using a strategic management perspective to review the evidence presented by Amihud and Lev in their earlier study (1981) and in their and Denis et al.'s critiques of our work (1999), we find no reason to revise our original conclusion: there is little theoretical or empirical basis for believing that monitoring by a firm's principals influences its diversification strategy and acquisition decisions.
AB - In their response to our paper, Amihud and Lev (1999) and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1999) claim that disciplinary differences don't matter and that methods and evidence should speak for themselves. In contrast, we argue that important differences exist between financial economics and strategic management, leading to differing beliefs, norms, methods, and interpretations of empirical results. Using a strategic management perspective to review the evidence presented by Amihud and Lev in their earlier study (1981) and in their and Denis et al.'s critiques of our work (1999), we find no reason to revise our original conclusion: there is little theoretical or empirical basis for believing that monitoring by a firm's principals influences its diversification strategy and acquisition decisions.
KW - Agency theory
KW - Diversification
KW - Management theory
KW - Mergers
KW - Scientific disciplines
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0008782221&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0008782221&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0008782221
VL - 20
SP - 1077
EP - 1086
JO - Strategic Management Journal
JF - Strategic Management Journal
SN - 0143-2095
IS - 11
ER -