Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result

Gerhard Glomm, B. Ravikumar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

64 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Our objective in this paper is to examine majority voting in an environment where both public and private alternatives coexist. We construct a model in which households are differentiated by income and have the option of choosing between publicly provided services and private services. Publicly provided services are financed through income tax revenues and made available to all citizens at zero price. Majority voting determines the tax rate. Even though preferences over tax rates are not single peaked, we provide conditions under which a majority voting equilibrium exists. We illustrate our existence result with CES preferences and a Dagum income distribution.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)187-199
Number of pages13
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Volume15
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1998
Externally publishedYes

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voting
taxes
tax revenue
income tax
income distribution
citizen
income
Majority voting
Tax rate
Tax revenues
Household
Income
Income tax
Income distribution

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Opting out of publicly provided services : A majority voting result. / Glomm, Gerhard; Ravikumar, B.

In: Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1998, p. 187-199.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Glomm, G & Ravikumar, B 1998, 'Opting out of publicly provided services: A majority voting result', Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 187-199.
Glomm, Gerhard ; Ravikumar, B. / Opting out of publicly provided services : A majority voting result. In: Social Choice and Welfare. 1998 ; Vol. 15, No. 2. pp. 187-199.
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