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Optimal insurance with adverse selection
Hector Chade
,
Edward Schlee
Economics
Research output
:
Contribution to journal
›
Article
›
peer-review
24
Scopus citations
Overview
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Business & Economics
Optimal Insurance
100%
Adverse Selection
72%
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
34%
Insurance
34%
Principal-agent Problem
30%
Competitive Model
30%
Curvature
28%
Riskiness
27%
Monopolist
25%
Menu
25%
Private Information
21%
Insurer
21%
Wisdom
21%
Risk Aversion
20%
Premium
18%
Wealth
17%