### Abstract

Recognizing the need for a deeper understanding of the interdependence between critical infrastructures, such as the power grid and the communication network, a number of models have been proposed and analyzed in the last few years. However, most of these proposed models are over simplified and fail to capture complex interdependencies that may exist between these critical infrastructures. The recently proposed Implicative Interdependency Model is able to capture these complex interdependencies involving conjunctive and disjunctive relationships to overcome most of these limitations. Due to the existing interdependencies between the power and communication networks, a failure involving a small set of power and/or communication network entities can trigger a cascading event, resulting in the failure of a much larger set of entities through the cascading failure process. This implies that an adversary with an intent of destroying a specific set of entities E′ (real targets), no longer needs to make an effort to destroy E′ directly, but instead identify a set of smaller entities E′ (pseudo targets), whose destruction eventually leads to the destruction of the real target set E′ due to the cascading failure process. A clever adversary will thus try to identify the smallest set of pseudo target entities E00, whose destruction eventually destroys E′. We refer to this problem as the Smallest Pseudo Target Set Identification Problem (SPTSIP). We divide the problem into four classes, and show that it is solvable in polynomial time for one class, and is NP-complete for others. We provide an approximation algorithm for the second class, and for the most general class, we provide an optimal solution using ILP, and a heuristic solution. We evaluate the efficacy of our heuristic using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The experiments show that our heuristic almost always produces near optimal results.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Title of host publication | Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM |

Publisher | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |

Pages | 1015-1020 |

Number of pages | 6 |

Volume | 2015-December |

ISBN (Print) | 9781509000739 |

DOIs | |

State | Published - Dec 14 2015 |

Event | 34th Annual IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2015 - Tampa, United States Duration: Oct 26 2015 → Oct 28 2015 |

### Other

Other | 34th Annual IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2015 |
---|---|

Country | United States |

City | Tampa |

Period | 10/26/15 → 10/28/15 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- Biological system modeling
- Communication networks
- Complexity theory
- Power grids
- Power system faults
- Power system protection
- Target tracking

### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Electrical and Electronic Engineering

### Cite this

*Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM*(Vol. 2015-December, pp. 1015-1020). [7357578] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2015.7357578

**On the smallest pseudo target set identification problem for targeted attack on interdependent power-communication networks.** / Das, Arun; Zhou, Chenyang; Banerjee, Joydeep; Sen, Arunabha; Greenwald, Lloyd.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

*Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM.*vol. 2015-December, 7357578, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 1015-1020, 34th Annual IEEE Military Communications Conference, MILCOM 2015, Tampa, United States, 10/26/15. https://doi.org/10.1109/MILCOM.2015.7357578

}

TY - GEN

T1 - On the smallest pseudo target set identification problem for targeted attack on interdependent power-communication networks

AU - Das, Arun

AU - Zhou, Chenyang

AU - Banerjee, Joydeep

AU - Sen, Arunabha

AU - Greenwald, Lloyd

PY - 2015/12/14

Y1 - 2015/12/14

N2 - Recognizing the need for a deeper understanding of the interdependence between critical infrastructures, such as the power grid and the communication network, a number of models have been proposed and analyzed in the last few years. However, most of these proposed models are over simplified and fail to capture complex interdependencies that may exist between these critical infrastructures. The recently proposed Implicative Interdependency Model is able to capture these complex interdependencies involving conjunctive and disjunctive relationships to overcome most of these limitations. Due to the existing interdependencies between the power and communication networks, a failure involving a small set of power and/or communication network entities can trigger a cascading event, resulting in the failure of a much larger set of entities through the cascading failure process. This implies that an adversary with an intent of destroying a specific set of entities E′ (real targets), no longer needs to make an effort to destroy E′ directly, but instead identify a set of smaller entities E′ (pseudo targets), whose destruction eventually leads to the destruction of the real target set E′ due to the cascading failure process. A clever adversary will thus try to identify the smallest set of pseudo target entities E00, whose destruction eventually destroys E′. We refer to this problem as the Smallest Pseudo Target Set Identification Problem (SPTSIP). We divide the problem into four classes, and show that it is solvable in polynomial time for one class, and is NP-complete for others. We provide an approximation algorithm for the second class, and for the most general class, we provide an optimal solution using ILP, and a heuristic solution. We evaluate the efficacy of our heuristic using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The experiments show that our heuristic almost always produces near optimal results.

AB - Recognizing the need for a deeper understanding of the interdependence between critical infrastructures, such as the power grid and the communication network, a number of models have been proposed and analyzed in the last few years. However, most of these proposed models are over simplified and fail to capture complex interdependencies that may exist between these critical infrastructures. The recently proposed Implicative Interdependency Model is able to capture these complex interdependencies involving conjunctive and disjunctive relationships to overcome most of these limitations. Due to the existing interdependencies between the power and communication networks, a failure involving a small set of power and/or communication network entities can trigger a cascading event, resulting in the failure of a much larger set of entities through the cascading failure process. This implies that an adversary with an intent of destroying a specific set of entities E′ (real targets), no longer needs to make an effort to destroy E′ directly, but instead identify a set of smaller entities E′ (pseudo targets), whose destruction eventually leads to the destruction of the real target set E′ due to the cascading failure process. A clever adversary will thus try to identify the smallest set of pseudo target entities E00, whose destruction eventually destroys E′. We refer to this problem as the Smallest Pseudo Target Set Identification Problem (SPTSIP). We divide the problem into four classes, and show that it is solvable in polynomial time for one class, and is NP-complete for others. We provide an approximation algorithm for the second class, and for the most general class, we provide an optimal solution using ILP, and a heuristic solution. We evaluate the efficacy of our heuristic using power and communication network data of Maricopa County, Arizona. The experiments show that our heuristic almost always produces near optimal results.

KW - Biological system modeling

KW - Communication networks

KW - Complexity theory

KW - Power grids

KW - Power system faults

KW - Power system protection

KW - Target tracking

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84959262278&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84959262278&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/MILCOM.2015.7357578

DO - 10.1109/MILCOM.2015.7357578

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:84959262278

SN - 9781509000739

VL - 2015-December

SP - 1015

EP - 1020

BT - Proceedings - IEEE Military Communications Conference MILCOM

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

ER -