On the role of fairness and social distance in designing effective social referral systems

Yili Hong, Paul A. Pavlou, Nan Shi, Kanliang Wang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Online referral systems help firms attract new customers and expand their customer base by leveraging the social relationships of existing customers. We integrate ultimatum game theory, which focuses on fairness, with motivation theories to investigate the effects of social distance and monetary incentives on the performance of three competing designs for online referral systems: rewarding only or primarily the proposer, rewarding only or primarily the responder, and dividing the reward equally or fairly between the proposer and responder. A set of controlled laboratory and randomized field experiments were conducted to test how the fairness of the split of the reward (equal/fair versus unequal/unfair split of the referral bonus) and social distance (small versus large) between the proposer and the responder jointly affect the performance of online referral systems (the proposer sending an offer and the responder accepting the offer). For a large social distance (acquaintances or weak tie relationships), equally splitting the referral bonus results in the best performance. However, for a small social distance (friends or strong tie relationships), an equal split of the referral reward does not improve referral performance, which suggests that under a small social distance, monetary incentives may not work effectively. Face validity and external validity (generalizability) are ensured using two distinct measures of social distance across several contexts. Through the analysis of the interaction effects of fairness and social distance, our research offers theoretical and practical implications for social commerce by showing that the effectiveness of fairness on the success of online social referrals largely depends on social distance.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)787-809
Number of pages23
JournalMIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems
Volume41
Issue number3
StatePublished - Sep 1 2017

Fingerprint

Online systems
Game theory
Fairness
Referral
Social distance
Experiments

Keywords

  • Fairness
  • Incentive design
  • Motivation
  • Online referral systems
  • Referral performance
  • Social distance
  • Ultimatum game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Management Information Systems
  • Information Systems
  • Computer Science Applications
  • Information Systems and Management

Cite this

On the role of fairness and social distance in designing effective social referral systems. / Hong, Yili; Pavlou, Paul A.; Shi, Nan; Wang, Kanliang.

In: MIS Quarterly: Management Information Systems, Vol. 41, No. 3, 01.09.2017, p. 787-809.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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